COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES

## PROCEEDINGS

(Defendant present.)

THE CLERK: Criminal No. 92-181, United States of

America v. Deborah Gore Dean. We have Judge Arlin Adams, Bruce

Swartz, Claudia Flynn for the government; Stephen Wehner for

Deborah Gore Dean; Gregory Hunt and Michael Meczkowski

representing the Probation Office.

THE COURT: All right, good morning, counsel. I've had a chance to review this again, and I've met again with the Probation Office to review the calculations, make sure that they're following in accordance with my rulings of yesterday, and I'm ready to proceed today with the sentencing.

I have received a government's supplemental memorandum regarding the sentencing as to an upward departure. I received the defendant's supplemental memorandum as to upward departure after my rulings of yesterday. I've received a letter from Ms. Dean that will be made part of the record along with all the other correspondence that was filed. It showed a copy to the Independent Counsel. I don't know if they've received it or not yet.

MR. SWARTZ: Yes.

THE COURT: You did, all right.

I have also received today a government's opposition to defendant's motion for release pending appeal or, in the alternative, a stay pending appellate review of a denial of

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All right, we're ready to proceed. Mr. Wehner, I'll 3 start with you to see whether there are under rule 32 any 4 further objections as to material factual issues under the 5 quidelines that we have not ruled upon just to make sure we've 6 considered this under the rule, all these issues, beyond what

we've already heard. I take it there is nothing else that

you're aware of that you wanted the Court to consider?

MR. WEHNER: Not that you haven't already ruled upon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I believe I've ruled upon the issues raised by the Independent Counsel in their objections to the presentence report as I did to the defendant's from my rulings the other day.

All right, now the Court will consider with its ruling the other day that the guideline 2F1.1 of 1990 is applicable, that is, the base level of 10 does not apply under the new guideline, but a base level of 6 under the fraud quideline of 1990, and that the loss provision does not apply directly, that is, any quantifiable monetary sum.

The government requests that the Court should make it an eight-level upward departure minus the two levels that account for the abuse of trust adjustment already that I made plus the two for minimal planning, that it would be appropriate All right, did you want to supplement that at all,
Mr. Swartz, that argument with anything? I have read through
it, and I'm going to hear from the defendant as to any
objections they have about the increase, but I just wanted to
know if you wanted to supplement that argument at all.

MR. SWARTZ: Your Honor, we're prepared to submit on the papers.

THE COURT: All right, I appreciate that.

All right, Mr. Wehner, you had filed a supplemental memorandum of law as to departure upward as warranted on the grounds that the loss does not capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct and whether if it's warranted an eight-point departure is appropriate, and I've read your memo. What did you wish to add to that?

MR. WEHNER: Your Honor, I would only state in addition to that that I believe that the increases the Court has already applied and the two-point increases for more than minimal planning and abuse of trust clearly encompass the conduct in this case and that therefore an additional increase over and above that already encompassed by the increases the Court has already ruled upon would be inappropriate, because

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this is not the rare case that is not encompassed by the guidelines that the Court has followed.

The one issue that takes us out of that rare case, frankly, Your Honor, is the fact that Ms. Dean did not receive money. She did not receive a bribe, and there is no indication that she personally in her own pocket benefited, which I believe is what is encompassed in terms of that increase that is focused on.

In this case, the people the program was designed to benefit in fact benefited. It may well be that different people would have benefited if the program would have been run differently, but Ms. Dean walked into a situation she didn't create. Admittedly, she did not handle it well. She handled it very poorly. She made very significant mistakes in both judgment and conduct, but to suggest that somehow this was borne out of greed or her conduct was venal, I do not believe that the evidence supports the type of rare conduct that should reproduce an eight-point increase.

MR. SWARTZ: Your Honor, may the government be heard briefly?

THE COURT: All right, certainly.

MR. SWARTZ: Thank you. Just in response, Your Honor, it is the government's position, of course, that defendant did benefit personally, and beyond that, defendant's family benefited extensively from the schemes that were proved up and

were found to be the judgments of conviction by the jury.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

All right, the Court is going to make the following ruling considering all the factors in this case as to whether an upward departure is appropriate under the guidelines considering application note 9 in the 1990 guidelines, under 2F1.1.

Application note 9 says, "Dollar loss often does not fully capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct. In such instances, an upward departure may be warranted. Examples may include the following: The offense caused a loss of confidence in an important institution."

In this case, it is evident the defendant's conduct along with others at HUD caused a major scandal that certainly eroded the public confidence in HUD, if not in the federal government. There's no question that individuals were favored because of political connections and not because of merit in the federal funding awards and that this conduct of the defendant's was intentional and serious. It's without question that it eroded the public's trust in the operations of our government.

The Court believes an upward departure is well warranted under the convictions rendered by the jury in this case. The Court's rulings, by not applying the present guidelines of 2C1.7, which the Court had ruled would be applicable, would start the defendant off with a much higher base level and with additions would subject her to much longer

penalties, but because of the dates of these offenses -- of the effective date of the guidelines, rather, the Court believes would pose an ex post facto problem, so the '90 have to be applied, but the 2C1.7 guideline now in effect reads as if it was meant for this case.

"This guideline applies only to those offenses committed by public officials or others acting with them that involve depriving others of the intangible right to honest services . . . or conspiracy to defraud the United States by interfering with governmental functions. 'Public official,' as used in this guideline, includes officers and employees of federal, state, or local government. 'Official holding a high-level decision making or sensitive position' includes . . . prosecuting attorneys, judges, agency administrators, supervisory law enforcement officers, and other governmental officials with similar levels of responsibility."

In addition, this new guideline states, "Where the court finds that the defendant's conduct was part of a systematic or pervasive corruption of a government function, process, or office that may cause loss of public confidence in government, an upward departure may be warranted" beyond the higher base level that is included in this new guideline. The new guideline is called "Fraud involving deprivation of the intangible right to the honest services of public officials; conspiracy to defraud by interference with governmental

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functions."

Because of the nature of the offenses here and the dates that are applicable, the Court cannot apply that guideline. However, the Court can certainly consider without running into ex post facto issues the eight-level increase as being appropriate.

The other comparative or analogous guidelines in the 1990 guidelines that we looked at were the gratuity guidelines. They didn't provide for an eight-level increase for officials holding high-level decision making or sensitive positions. The bribery guidelines in the 1990 guidelines provided the same. The conflict of interest did not, but the original finding by the Probation Office was that the gratuity guidelines applied, so that the eight-level offense increase could apply as well even on the 1990.

Where the guidelines adopted this identical eight-level increase in the new guidelines for a conspiracy to defraud the United States, which is the offense here, it seems that that was the thinking of the commission all along.

Because of the offenses in counts 1 and 2 the defendant was convicted of, which the jury found proven beyond a reasonable doubt that she, in essence, manipulated along with others the federal housing program to favor certain friends and political consultants, and because she was the executive assistant to the secretary of HUD and the testimony has been

And this makes a substantial difference, because if the Court did not increase, the defendant, Ms. Dean, would be eligible for some type of interim confinement and service of her sentence at other than perhaps a confinement as normally contemplated, that is, a jail or penitentiary confinement, but this increase will make that unavailable.

So the Court finds a base offense level to counts 1 and 2, which are grouped under United States Sentencing Guideline 3D1.1(d), as the underlying offense is fraud. That's under 2F1.1, as I ruled the other day. That comes about by applying, for the record, again the guideline for the offense of 18 U.C.S. 371, 2X1.1. That's a base offense level of 6. A specific offense characteristics of more than minimal level, a two-level increase is warranted under guideline 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). Adjustment for role in the offense is she abused a position of

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public trust in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission and concealment of this offense, and there's another two-level increase under 3B1.3. There is no longer an adjustment for obstruction of justice based upon the Court's ruling of two days ago. So that's a base level of 10.

We will increase that because the amount of loss, according to the Court's ruling, did not fully capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the defendant's conduct, so an upward departure is warranted for the reasons I've already given. It's clear that there was a loss of confidence in an important institution involving her false statements, and it was essentially non-monetary as to Ms. Dean at least in nature.

Therefore, I will use an eight-level increase warranted for a high government official under 2C1.2(b)(2)(B), minus a two-level increase for abuse of trust, that's a level 16 for the final offense level.

Level 16 in the 1990 guidelines in a criminal history category of I, that says no prior convictions, is an imprisonment range of 21 to 27 months. It will carry with it a supervised release up to three years and a fine of \$5,000 to This is just addressing counts 1 and 2. So that will be the ruling of the Court.

I'll hear from the parties, beginning with the government, the Independent Counsel, as to an appropriate sentence within that range and also as to appropriate sentences

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for counts 3 through 12.

MR. ADAMS: With deference to the Court, it's obvious from the Court's remarks that you have given a great deal of thought to the entire sentencing process and certainly to the guidelines, and therefore I think my remarks should be brief. You know this case. You know the facts. You sat through an extensive trial, and your patience has permitted you to read very extensive briefs. I think this case, given the fact that there's a single defendant, has been briefed almost as well as anything I've ever seen and probably as much as you've ever seen.

The only thing I would say is that we all have to be mindful of the perceptions in the community regarding crime and the sentences. There is a perception that I have observed and perhaps the Court has that frequently affluent defendants, well-connected defendants, defendants who are well educated and can afford expensive lawyers, do not receive punishments that are commensurate with punishments that those from minority communities receive.

It is very serious when a young minority representative goes into a liquor store and steals a couple of bottles of liquor, and he should be punished, and the courts do punish him. But the consequences of that conduct really pale in comparison with what the public perceives when an affluant defendant, well educated, without any economic pressures whatsoever, distorts an

entire department, certainly a program under the department, that was designed to help the less-advantaged people in our community, and that's what happened.

This entire department was seriously jeopardized for more than four years. From what I hear, it still has not regained its former composure. Confidence in these programs has been seriously eroded. There are very few programs today for low-cost housing to help the less fortunate in our country, which is a major, major problem. There are some people who believe that it's one of the core problems creating a good deal of the pervasive crime.

So that what happened here is not another infraction, but a very serious infraction that impacts on the entire community, not only the District of Columbia community, which is, of course, very important, but the national community. And the Court in its sentencing, of course, as it always does, sends a community -- a message to the community as to what is viewed as serious, less serious, and not so serious, and it's because of those considerations that I would urge that the Court consider the higher end of level 16 which it's now determined. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Adams.

Mr. Wehner, I'll hear from you, sir, and then from Ms. Dean.

MR. WEHNER: Thank you, Your Honor. With all due

respect, Your Honor, I disagree with the eight-count increase in terms of the finding of the level 16. I think that it is highly excessive given the fact that the calculation reached by the Court previously clearly encompasses the conduct for which Ms. Dean stands convicted and recognize the Court can have a difference of opinion on those issues, but I would like the Court to please consider the following, and I will rebut Judge Adams' statement at the same time, if I may.

Ms. Dean is deserving of justice based upon the facts of the case. Ms. Dean is not deserving of some different breed of justice because she happens to not be a member of a minority group who stole money from a liquor store. She's entitled to the same deference, same compassion, and the same understanding from the criminal justice system that any other defendant can find in this courtroom, and I frankly find it insulting to the system for Judge Adams to suggest that somehow Ms. Dean does not get the same kind of justice from this Court or any other courtroom in this courthouse that anyone else has the right to expect.

Ms. Dean -- and with all due respect, Your Honor, to the extent it matters, I'll just make one factual correction.

Ms. Dean is basically bankrupt, and her family is bankrupt. Now I say that not because it's relevant. I say that only to correct the record.

This case should be determined in terms of a sentence,

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Your Honor, based upon the evidence that was taken and listened to at trial, and you should be able to substitute X for Ms. Dean. But at sentencing, you need to look, I think, at what was proven at trial and then add to that, which the Court has clearly already determined, how the sentence can be appropriately set for this defendant.

Given Your Honor's ruling on the eight-level increase, there is absolutely no reason, given the facts that were proven in this case, to increase the sentence over and above the lowest possible level, no reason based upon status or power or white or It just doesn't exist. If there is deterrence, which I believe I can infer from what the Court was focusing on your remarks previously, in this matter, a 21-month sentence sends that signal about as convincingly as it can be sent.

I submit to the Court and I beg the Court to reconsider the entire eight-level increase, because as your Court recognized -- as the Court recognized, that indeed is a dramatic increase in terms of the, the options that are available to the Court at sentencing, and when the Court assumes that entire increase, nonetheless decreasing that by the two points as previously discussed, it's very difficult within the sentencing guidelines as they are drafted to find alternatives, as the Court pointed out.

I would also suggest to the Court that based upon the letter that Ms. Dean submitted to the Court, that there is a

I think this case represents a very difficult situation, because the facts in this case are largely circumstantial, and they can be interpreted in different fashions. There is no doubt that the Court is correct and Judge Adams is correct that the facts taken in the light most favorable to the Independent Counsel show a systematic corruption of the government process.

At the same time, Your Honor, Ms. Dean was a very young lady when she undertook this position. She was 31 years old. She was beset with a very high position in which she clearly did not have the experience that was necessary to handle it. What she should have done in retrospect is had nothing to do with the Moderate Rehabilitation program. Maybe she could have continued to do her job.

Those aren't said in terms of excuses, Your Honor, but I would request that you reconsider the eight-level increase, I request that you consider the decrease by two points for acceptance of responsibility, and with the Court's permission, I request that you allow Ms. Dean to self-report if your sentence includes a sentence of incarceration. I request that you recommend that the designated institution be Lexington,

sit down for a minute, because I'm going to have a ruling to

make, and it will take a minute.

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One, the letter of February 24, 1994, that will be filed as part of the record this Court received from the defendant. It's a page-and-a-half letter indicating to the Court that Ms. Dean, while contesting vigorously the charges against her and disagreeing with the factual conclusions drawn by the Independent Counsel and the jury, she recognizes she had made significant and serious mistakes, recognized these mistakes have harmed people she cared about and have caused people to believe less in the integrity and honesty of their government and the people who serve in it.

She recognizes that people of the United States have a right to expect the programs administered by the government are handled in a manner that is consistent with the law and the representatives in government would discharge their responsibilities with honor and integrity.

Ms. Dean states she failed to maintain the proper degree of separation between her public and private life that every public official should maintain, that she was young, impassioned, inexperienced, and overly trusting of people when she came to HUD and did not question people's motivations, and that she should have handled her relationship with others differently. She should not have entertained inquiries from John Mitchell on any HUD matters, inquiries from Colonel Brennan, or anyone else connected with or someone close to her family.

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She should have distanced herself from Mr. Shelby, Mr. Sankin as well, and she did not do her part to curb the oppressive influence from various politicians, consultants, and others that they had on this or other HUD programs.

She acknowledged previously and does again that her involvement with Mr. Kitchin was the worst mistake in her life, and her own judgment should have told her better that it was wrong.

She said she cannot find the words to express the sadness that she feels and that she knows she could not make these verbally, so she wrote this letter instead as her statement basically to the Court at the time of sentencing. She felt she had went to HUD out of a desire to serve the disadvantaged in this country but that she understands service with her country means service with honor and that what she mourns more than anything else is the dishonor that's been cast upon herself, her family, and a department whose missions she heartily admires.

That will be made part of the record. Thank you.

What the Court has today is the duty to sentence Ms. Dean in accordance with its rulings of the lengthy presentence hearings that we have had as to the guideline application and as to the other ten counts that are not covered by the guidelines in accordance with the Court's ruling.

As a basis for its ruling, reflecting on the remarks

by Mr. Adams and Mr. Wehner and Ms. Dean, there is no question that the trial brought forth there was systematic corruption of the government process at the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the past years. It was a program passed by Congress but poorly implemented by the Executive. It's a program where not just Ms. Dean, who was a staff person, who had no legal authority to issue any documents that were binding, but had to have an assistant secretary sign off or a deputy assistant secretary, that has resulted in various individuals who had those positions pleading guilty, Mr. DeBartolomeis, Mr. Demery, other less involved people as well.

Mr. DeBartolomeis, who pled guilty to conspiracy and illegal supplementations of an official salary and making false statements, was sentenced to one year probation to run on all counts concurrent, a fine of \$750, and he was an assistant secretary of HUD. He was given that sentence because of his cooperation with the Independent Counsel.

Mr. Demery has pled guilty to one count of illegal receipt of a gratuity and a count of obstruction of justice and has not been sentenced but is cooperating with the Independent Counsel.

Philip Winn, who was involved as a developer as well as formerly with HUD, has pled guilty to conspiracy and has not been sentenced but is cooperating. Other officials have been charged and convicted after trial, Lance Wilson being one who

was convicted of only one count of an illegal gratuity and sentenced. He's out pending appeal now on bond.

It is apparent from the testimony at trial that once this program was put into effect, that the institution at HUD was subject to great manipulation by those in positions of influence either in Congress or in the private sector, who had political ties and political power. It is evident from the testimony that it was historic at HUD apparently to make awards to help out various members of the majority party at that time or at least to the political party in the Executive Branch at least, to their advantage.

Listening to the testimony of the consultants that descended upon the HUD with this discretionary funding and rehab that became available under Secretary Pierce and apparently other programs that existed in the past somewhat similarly and the political interference in the awarding of these programs, it's sort of like locust descending on a lettuce patch in their approach to the goods that were to be gained from the program.

It is apparent to the Court that some of this influence was brought to bear to make these various awards, and it was not only brought about by the developers attempting to use Washington contacts, which has been with us since we've had our government for over 200 years and is not per se wrong, but perhaps brought about by a frustration with the bureaucratic maze and intransigence and Byzantine regulations and long delays

1 | inherent in the process of attempting to obtain funds for 2 | various programs at HUD.

That does not excuse a favortism. At the best, it could be described as the worst corrupt awarding of these contracts or these rehab awards, these moderate rehabilitation awards that was given, according to the testimony in this case, to individuals who had access to Ms. Dean and to others at HUD who have pled guilty or have been accused as unindicted co-conspirators and have testified under grants of immunity. It is evident there was a lack of leadership at the highest levels and a failure to give appropriate direction at HUD during those particular years.

What concerns the Court the most and is part of the rationale for the eight-level increase which forbades Ms. Dean from going out on probation and makes her serve a term of imprisonment in a jail, despite the fact she's a first offender with a spotless record and has done some very good things in her life, is not the argument that she should be treated differently than a minority person who appears before Court.

Congress sets the laws in the sentencing mechanism in the federal court these days, and the mandatory minimums give the Court very little discretion in sentencing a drug defendant. That simply is not within our purview as judges in the federal system any longer to have great discretion in sentencing under the guidelines, under the mandatory minimums in certain

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But what gives the Court concern is a sense of honor that apparently was lost in that particular era at HUD among the political appointees and not just Ms. Dean, but the others as well, and how that does corrupt and diminish the quality of service of the government, and for those young people growing up who wish to serve in the government or consider what their government means to them as a private citizen, it's all too easy today to be cynical when we see examples of the evidence that came out in this case of how the department operated with the interference of various Congresspersons as well as these outside political consultants, many of whom had no knowledge of HUD business of the development of moderate rehab housing and were not experts in any such area, but because of their political influence were perceived to be able to obtain favorable action on these applications that the developers had filed or would file and simply got to a position after a while, according to the evidence, that the moderate rehab units were for awarding to politically connected individuals who used the right consultants and had the right people from the Congress and the Senate on their side and could through connections and through large fees paid to these consultants, who had no real expertise in the area, obtain these lucrative moderate rehabilitation awards.

One thing should be clear, I think, in the record, and that is there's no evidence that any awards that were made were

made to developers who were not otherwise fully qualified to receive these awards, and that they did not go to benefit the areas in the cities and the communities needed. There's no evidence that, at least in this case -- I don't know about other cases -- that the developers were somehow unqualified developers who pocketed these funds illegally.

The only evidence is they went to competing jurisdictions because of a scarcity of funds. There was a great competition to receive these awards, and they went to areas, all of which needed housing. It just didn't go by a fair process, but there's no evidence that the awards did not eventually go to properties for rehabilitation that did not need it and did not eventually result in better housing for the disadvantaged.

But in today's world, when we see what I think is a loss in the government that the community feels -- there was a recent survey in the paper as to truthfulness and who do you believe, and politicians came out towards the very bottom, a very low percentage, I think under 10 percent somewhere, and I think that reflects perhaps the country's feeling, the community's feeling as to the trustworthiness of their elected officials, and that also ties in, I believe, with the type of activities that we heard of in this trial.

While I think Ms. Dean -- and I've considered this at length in the type of sentence that I've structured for her under both the law and that I'll give as to the other ten counts

for which she's convicted -- was wrong, I do not think and I don't think the evidence supports she was a mastermind of this whole process and was some brilliant strategist, some Machiavellian person who was solely responsible for these awards. That would be to bely the evidence in the case of the other corrupt assistant secretaries and the other consultants and the way the program had been established in HUD as well as by Congress.

That is not to diminish her responsibility I think that she has of late begun to realize. It is too late to give her two points credit for acceptance of responsibility under the guidelines, after having gone through a full trial and testimony. Her exposure would have been much greater had guidelines applied to other counts that I ruled they did not and had the charges that she was convicted of in the other counts been covered by the guidelines.

I do believe she was a young, immature individual, who was given responsibilities far beyond her capabilities at HUD and should never have been placed in that position and that there was a total failure to oversee her activities by the secretary in an appropriate fashion, and I do believe the evidence shows there were multiple levels of political appointees at HUD who operated inappropriately in that time frame.

That does not excuse Ms. Dean for her conduct,

however, but has perhaps some basis of why she did these things, because it was one of the things in the Court's mind as to the motivation involved, and I did not see greed as an underlying motivation, where you find many of these public corruptions come from. There were gratuities, there were dinners, there were lunches, flowers, some presents not of great value, but nothing of the level that one would consider to be in accordance with the amount of the awards that were made in this case of millions upon millions of dollars and the hundreds and hundreds of thousand dollars earned by the consultants through her assistance. There's no evidence of any of that in those sums at least of being given to Ms. Dean.

I think the motivation was something different. I think that her actions exhibited a lack of understanding of her obligations and responsibilities as a high government official, total failure to comprehend her duties and obligations to the country, and an atmosphere that existed of political influence improperly exercised -- there may be cases where it's properly used -- and a naivete and an egotism perhaps about herself in feeling that she was essentially the head person there to make these decisions and to influence the others and to run the office as she wished and for which she must be held accountable.

For those reasons, the Court is going to pass the following sentence in this matter upon Ms. Deborah Gore Dean:

It will be the judgment of this Court, Ms. Dean, pursuant to the

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as in existence in 1990, that defendant Deborah Gore Dean is committed hereby to the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons for a term of 21 months on counts 1 and 2, to run concurrently. That is the lowest level allowed under my eight-point increase that I've given you and does not allow you to be released on probation or other type of community confinement, but must be served in a federal institution.

Under the sentencing guidelines, there's truth in sentencing; that means 21 months will be served absent a very few days. This is an upward departure based upon the nature of the loss in this case and for the reasons I've previously given as being appropriate.

As to counts 1 and 2, the sentence is concurrent, and upon your release from imprisonment, you will be subject to a term of supervised release for two years, to run concurrent in counts 1 and 2.

Within 72 hours of your release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, you will report in person to the Probation Office to the district in which you're released, and while on supervised release, you will not commit another federal, state, or local crime. You will follow all the standard conditions of supervised release that have been adopted by the Court, and additionally the following special conditions will apply:

One, you will not possess firearms or dangerous

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counts 3 through 12.

weapons, and two, provide the Probation Office access to any requested financial information.

Additionally, I'm going to penalize you as follows, finding that you do have some abilities, if not now, through your capabilities in the future to pay a fine. It is ordered that you will pay a fine of \$5,000 on counts 1 and 2 in toto. That fine may be paid in installments to be worked out by the Probation Office in accordance with your financial means.

As to counts 3 through 12, of which you were convicted, the other conspiracy counts, the counts involving an illegal gratuity from Mr. Kitchin, perjury counts, and the scheme to falsify, conceal, or cover up false statements, many of those run together, counts 5 through 12 basically. Count 4, the illegal gratuity count, the others are the conspiracy counts.

The sentence on those counts will be under the sentencing laws that pertained prior to the guidelines' effective date, since they were committed prior to that time, and it will be the judgment of the Court as to the sentence imposed in that case that defendant Deborah Gore Dean will be sentenced in counts 3 through 12 to serve a term of 21 months, to run concurrent with the sentence given in counts 1 and 2. There will be no fine beyond that already imposed in counts 1 and 2 and no additional terms or conditions to that sentence on

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Defendant will pay a special assessment for the conviction on each case of \$50, on each count, for a total of \$600, which will be due in the next 24 hours.

I've expressed the rationale for this sentence, deeming that it is appropriate, Ms. Dean, because of the convictions under the guidelines reflecting substantial systematic corruption of the government process, you have to serve a period of incarceration in prison. As opposed to those other individuals who have pled guilty to the same thing and have been given probation or lesser sentences, this will be the longest sentence I know of given in the HUD scandal to date.

The sentence is not given so much with the thought that it's rehabilitative, because I do not believe Ms. Dean would be in the position or would do these actions again, being older and wiser, but is necessary because of the nature of the harm to the government and to the community by these actions and to satisfy the community's need that such actions cannot go unpunished.

It is hoped that those who are serving in government now in various positions would take heed of this situation and be apprised of this sentence that the Court deems appropriate in in circumstance, even though I have a first offender before me, who many times, unless Congress mandates a mandatory minimum sentence be imposed, would be eligible for probation in other circumstances.

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appellate process.

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All right, counsel, there is the matter to take up of the defendant's availability for bond pending appeal. Additionally, obviously, Ms. Dean has ten days from today to file her notice of appeal, and if she can't afford counsel, one would be appointed for her to represent her through her

The government has opposed the motion for the defendant to remain at large pending appeal. She has asked that she be released under the law that requires the Court to consider whether or not there's a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal under the meaning of Title 18, section 3143 of the Bail Reform Act for release pending appeal. The presumption of release pending appeal is the presumption of a valid conviction, referring to the standards set forth in the law as to whether or not there's a close question that could be decided either way.

Let me ask Mr. Wehner a couple of questions on that As to the areas of law or close questions of fact that could be decided either way that would affect the verdict, how would that apply as to the Kitchin count in this matter, count You've made some general allegations in your omnibus motion about perhaps misconduct of the Independent Counsel's trial attorney in his closing argument that I chastised him for or their use of witnesses that I critiqued them for, the way they used them, etc., but what other areas beyond that that should

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affect the Court's analysis under the Bail Reform Act of whether Ms. Dean is eligible for being released on bond at this time?

MR. WEHNER: In terms of Mr. Kitchin's testimony, Your Honor, I do not believe that Mr. Kitchin testified that he, referring specifically to count 4, participated in a conspiracy with Ms. Dean that resulted in him giving her a gratuity as provided for under the statute. I think that specifically goes to counts 3 and 4, which is what the Court's referring to.

Secondly, the violations pretrial in terms of the Brady information obviously go to all counts. It's clear to me and Your Honor has referred to it as zealousness as opposed to misconduct. I think there's a very fine line between zealousness and misconduct, and I think if the Court of Appeals reviews the record, especially as it pertains to Brady and especially as it pertains to Mr. Kitchin, because if Your Honor will recall the Brady material that was provided pursuant to Mr. Kitchin, he didn't remember whether he'd made -- my recollection is some of the Brady material provided he didn't remember whether he'd made such a payment and what the amount was and whether it had been paid back, and that Brady material was given to us very, very late in the process, and in fact, the availability of it was -- its existence was denied before the trial started by the Independent Counsel.

So clearly the pretrial rulings regarding <u>Brady</u> clearly applied not only to the counts that Your Honor is

referring to, but clearly also to the Kitchin counts.

I think secondly, Your Honor, I think the attack upon Ms. Dean's credibility during the closing clearly related to inviting the jury to disbelieve the entire context of her testimony, and if the jury had believed Ms. Dean as to the Kitchin payments, the jury could have found that they were not, not because of her official status. They could have found that they were for some other purpose, thus defending as a matter of fact and law the gratuity allegation.

With regards to -- those are the two issues that could result in a reversal as pertain to the Kitchin count, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. At this time, the Court has before it the motion for bond pending appeal. In looking at this, I asked as to the status of similar matters. Mr. Lance Wilson was convicted of a count of gratuity and sentenced to a period of imprisonment and was, in the colloquial, stepped back and denied bond pending appeal. He took an emergency appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals released him in another HUD matter, holding that he had a substantial or close question, one that could be decided the other way, disagreeing with the trial judge's assessment of his situation, and that involved a statute of limitations issue.

There's no question in my mind that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community and any

appeal would not be for the purpose of delay. The issue is whether or not the various charges of which she's convicted raise substantial questions of fact or law likely to result in an order for a new trial or reversal.

That puts the Judge somewhat in the anomalous position of saying he's made error. If you read the statute strictly, I think the courts of appeal have approached the analysis a little differently, so we are not totally boxed in as to whether or not there's a close question or one that could very well be decided the other way.

Quoting the United States, <u>United States v.</u>

<u>Perholtz</u>, at 836 F.2d 555, a 1987 case, referring to an earlier First Circuit case, <u>United States v. Bayco</u>, 774 F.2d at 523, an '85 First Circuit case, it is apparent to the Court that this case is not a simple one, that there are various issues that could have been decided either way that could affect the outsome materially of this case as to all counts, that is, that the statute of limitations is a substantial issue of law, that the guidelines themselves have presented substantial issues that could substantially change the sentence if it's determined they do not apply; for instance, the defendant could be eligible for parole very early on with this sentence or at least could have had considerations of probation as to the first two counts.

It's apparent that there are questions as to the effect of certain evidence that was admitted by the Court, such

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as the documents involving Mr. Sankin being connected up with Ms. Dean or not and what was known or not prior to their admission by the Independent Counsel about their reliability; that there are questions, substantial questions as to the characterization of Ms. Dean's testimony by the trial counsel in closing argument; and as to the theories advanced by the Independent Counsel as to the conspiracies being conspiracies and the testimony as to the perjuries and what is perjury or not on the perjury and false statements counts, all of which lead the Court to believe there are close questions and substantial issues that can be decided either way upon review, and that being the fact, the Court will grant Ms. Dean's request for bond pending appeal under the statute, finding that to be so, and that she'll not be detained, but released on the same terms and conditions previously that she has been released on.

The matter in the Court of Appeals may take a year to two years to be resolved. If the defendant is required to serve her period of incarceration now, she could face the anomalous situation, which has happened previously and I think is unfair, of serving a sentence and having her convictions reversed.

So therefore under the Bail Reform Act as referred to by the Court, it believes that the defendant has qualified to remain out on bond at this time with the findings that I've made.

Mr. Wehner, I don't know if you're going to represent

Ms. Dean on appeal or not, but I've advised you here on the record of her rights to appeal and the timeliness in which the 2 appeal must be noted or her rights could be waived, and I take it on you to follow up on that. MR. WEHNER: Your Honor, I've informed Ms. Dean of 5 6 that, and she has retained appellate counsel. 7 THE COURT: All right. MR. WEHNER: Your Honor, can I ask again that you make 8 9 reference in your judgment that she be ordered to Lexington? 10 THE COURT: I can make a request for it. I cannot guarantee it. 11 12 MR. WEHNER: Yes, sir. 13 THE COURT: But at such time as she would have to report to service of her sentence, I would request that it would 14 15 be at Lexington. I would also provide for a voluntary 16 reporting; that is, she would not be arrested and taken in. 17 would voluntarily report to the prison to which she would be 18 assigned. 19 MR. WEHNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right, I want to thank counsel for their hard work on both sides in this case and the efforts they 21 22 put into it. Thank you, counsel. 23 We'll stand in recess. 24 (Which were all the proceedings had

at this time.)

## CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTER

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

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